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MARITAL PROPERTY PROBLEMS
MARITAL PROPERTY PROBLEMS FROM AN OIL AND
'GAS LESSEE'S STANDPOINT
W. D. Masterson, Jr.*
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES3 HE husband as manager of the community property usually
has power to dispose of or encumber such property without
the wife's consent or joinder.' Exceptions to the usual rule exist
when (a) the property constitutes homestead; (b) the wife acts
alone but with consent of the husband;2 (c) possibly when the
property constitutes special community!
The husband also usually has power to dispose of or encumber
his separate property without the wife's -consent or joinder. The
most important exception to this rule is where the property consti-
tutes homestead.
In considering the wife's separate property, it is necessary to
distinguish between personalty and realty. Except as to stocks and
bonds, the wife has control over personal property.4 As to realty,
it is usually necessary that both husband and wife sign the instru-
ment affecting it.
An important principle to bear in mind is that whenever it is
necessary for a married woman to sign a conveyance involving
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I This article is without reference to the tests for determining whether a given
tract is separate or community. For a good discussion of the effect of non.residence,
see Thomas and Thomas, Community property and the Conflict of Laws: A Recapitu-
lation, 4 SouTHwE SmN L J. 46 (1950). Problems raised when one spouse dies are
discussed in a comment, Problems on the Administration of Community Property, this
issue.
2 Thomas v. Chance, 11 Tex. 634 (1854) ; Leyva v. Rodriguez, 195 S. W. (2d) 704
(Tex. Civ. App. 1946), error refused.
3 The rules and problems incident to special community will not be covered herein.
They are discussed in comment, Control and Disposition of Special Community Prop-
erty, 4 SourTwESTm_ L J. 88 (1950). As to the wife's emergency power to contract,
see comment, The Wife's Emergency Powers, 4 SouTrHwESmN L J. 112 (1950).
' See comment, this issue, The Wife's Contracts, both as to her right of control,
and as to her power to contract relative to her separate property.
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realty, it is also usually essential that she acknowledge it in the
manner required by the statute governing acknowledgements of
married women.'
As indicated, the wife's joinder is necessary if the property
constitutes homestead, even though said property is the separate
property of the husband, or is part of the general community.
Such joinder is also necessary if the property, though not home-
stead, is the separate property of the wife. There is, however, an
important difference between the two situations. If her joinder is
necessary because the property is her separate property, then the
result of her failure to properly join is that the instrument as to
her is a nullity.' On the other hand, if the only reason for joinder
is that the property is homestead, her failure to join does not
render the instrument void. It simply gives her a right to avoid
the transaction. This right is lost unless asserted while the prop-
erty is still homestead. It also may be lost by some subsequent act
by the wife indicating consent to the transaction.7
2. CONTRACTS TO EXECUTE OIL AND GAS LEASES
Frequently when an oil company desires to procure leases in a
given area, it follows the procedure of first attempting to secure
contracts obligating the persons believed to be the owners to exe-
cute leases. These contracts give the lessee a designated time to ex-
amine title and obligate the lessor to execute the lease and the
lessee to accept and pay therefor within such time if title is mar-
ketable, or satisfactory to the lessee.
Sometimes the lessors have an incentive from a business stand-
point to avoid compliance with such a contract if possible.' Thus,
5 Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Downey, 143 Tex. 171, 183 S. W. (2d) 426 (1944).
6 Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Downey, supra, note 5, Compare Burens v. Brown,
290 S. W. 1086 (1927), 118 Tex. 551, 18 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1929).
7 Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 79 S. W. (2d) 619 (1935).
8 Of course sometimes it is the lessee who has the incentive to avoid, as where
a nearby well is completed as a dry hole. However, when the problem of voidability
is presented by the fact that one party is a married woman, the option to avoid rests
with her and does not give a similar option to the lessee.
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pending title examination, the mineral value of the tract covered
by the contract may become much higher; or farmer Jones may
learn that his neighbor made a better deal with the oil company,
and feel highly wronged.
Obviously, then, it is important to the lessee to secure binding
contracts.
While there is a conflict of authority elsewhere, the Texas rule
is well settled that a contract to execute an oil and gas lease on a
usual form involves an interest in realty. To be enforceable, such
a contract must be evidenced by a written instrument meeting the
requirements of the statute of frauds, which include a correct
property description and also a specific description of the pro-
posed lease.9
If the property therein described is part of the general com-
munity estate or of the husband's separate estate and is not home-
stead, it is not necessary to secure the wife's joinder."
If the property is homestead, or the separate property of the
wife, then the prospective lessee should be on guard. This is
because it is a general rule that a married woman is not bound
by a contract to convey realty, but only by an actual conveyance."
Any time leases are desired in a potentially valuable field, the
prospective lessee should give careful consideration to seeking to
secure oil and gas leases instead of contracts in those instances in
which it appears probable that the wife's signature will be neces-
sary. Of course the objection to this procedure is that it may develop
that the parties executing the lease do not have title. There are
several possible answers to this objection: the parties can agree
to a deferred consideration; even if the consideration is immedi-
ately payable, the warranty in the lease may result in recovery
9 Fagg v. Texas Co., et aL., 57 S. W. (2d) 87 (Tex. Comm App. 1933).
1OTx. REv. Cv. STATUTES (Vernon's 1948) art. 4619. It is advisable when pos-
sible to secure the wife's signature to avoid fact questions as to homestead and as
to whether the property is actually general community.
11 The same rule applies even though the lease is executed and placed in escrow.
Maynard v. Gilliam, 225 S. W. 818 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). For a good discussion
and collection of cases, see WALKER, CASES ON OIL AND GAs, Vol. 1, p. 426 (1948).
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from the husband of the purchase price; frequently the bonus is
relatively small, and the risk of losing it may be more than offset
by the risk of losing the lease.
Sometimes the lawyer is not called in until after a contract has
been procured, and the wife has refused to perform. While the
position of the lessee is not of the best, it is not necessarily hope-
less. Several possibilities should be explored. Possibly the contract
could be sustained as having the requisites or effect of conveyance;
as reasonably necessary to the preservation of the wife's separate
property; as reasonably necessary to provide her with the necessi-
ties of life; or, if the husband is mentally incompetent, as a valid
exercise of power as the community manager."
3. OIL AND GAS LEASES
In Texas an oil and gas lease on a usual form conveys to the
lessee a determinable fee title in realty." Remembering that a
married woman usually can be bound only by a conveyance as
distinguished from a contract to convey, it is important that the
lease include words of conveyance. All, or practically all, oil and
gas leases include sufficient words of grant in the granting clause.
Some forms, however, do not include such words in the mother
hubbard, or all-inclusive clause.14 However, it seems that even
here, the requirement in this respect is met by the wording of the
granting clause. 6
Briefly, if the property constitutes general community or the
husband's separate property, and is not homestead, the wife's
joinder, while advisable to avoid potentially dangerous fact ques-
tions, is not necessary. If the property is homestead or the separate
property of the wife, her joinder is necessary.
12 See supra not 3. While a money judgment would often be a poor substitute for
a lease, the lessee should also consider the possibility of proceeding against the hus-
band for breach of warranty.
13 Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil and Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S. W. 290,
29 A.L.R.. 566 (1923).14 This is the clause which follows the specific property description and in effect pro-
vides that the lease also covers adjacent land owned or claimed by the lessor.




When it is desired to change the terms of an existing lease, the
same rules are applicable to the transaction purportedly effectuat-
ing the change as to the original lease transaction. For example,
suppose the original lease described the wrong tract, and it is
desired to correct this mistake. The correction instrument must
meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Further, if words
of conveyance were necessary in the original instrument, they are
also necessary in the correction instrument. As a married man can
be bound by contract as well as by conveyance, logically as to him
the absence of such words should not be fatal. This is especially
true in the light of Article 1301, which provides in effect that a
defective conveyance having the requisites of a contract shall be
enforceable as a contract. However, several court of civil appeals
decisions have held a correction or ratification instrument to be a
nullity even as to the husband where words of conveyance are
lacking.1" It is submitted that these decisions are wrong and that
when the opportunity presents itself they should be overruled. Of
course, as to a married woman, it is and should be essential that
words of conveyance be included in a correction instrument."7
There is an important distinction between changing the terms
of the lease, and accepting as performance of existing terms, some-
thing other than that required by such terms. Thus, if the property
is community and homestead, and it is desired to change the lease,
a written instrument with words of conveyance executed by both
husband and wife is necessary. On the other hand, if it is desired
to substitute performance, the husband alone, as community man-
ager, can accept substituted performance.
Nowhere are the results and importance of this distinction bet-
16 Humble Oil and Refining Co. v. Johnston, 76 S. W. (2d) 818 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934, error dismissed; Redden v. Pure Oil Co., 86 S. W. (2d) 874 (TeL Civ. App.
1935). Compare the reasoning in these opinions, and the Crabb Case, cited therein,
with that in Sun Oil Co. v. Burns, supra note 15; Baker v. Westcott, 73 Tex. 129, 11
S. W. 157 (1889), and Magee v. Young, 143 Tex. 485, 198 S. W. (2d) 883 (1947).
17 Thompson v. Crim, 132 Tex. 586. 126 S. W. (2d) 18 (1939).
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ter illustrated than in the two opinions of the Supreme Court and
in the dissenting opinion in Gulf Production Co. v. Continental
Oil Co."8 In that case, the husband accepted property other than
money in satisfaction of three years delay rentals. The court held
that this substituted performance kept the lease in effect.
The cases have not as yet evolved a formula for discerning the
border line between lease amendments and substituted perform-
ance, and no attempt to do so will be made herein. Suffice it to
say that the safe procedure is always to secure a lease amend-
ment meeting the requirements applicable to an original oil and
gas lease; further, if the problem is presented after the transac-
tion relied upon has occurred, the possibility of upholding the
lease upon the basis of substituted performance should be ex-
plored.
5. RATIFICATION
Here the problem is not changing the original lease, but rather
in seeking to breathe life into it by virtue of some transaction
subsequent to its execution.
Here again the Texas authorities do not justify formulation of
specific principles. Several general rules, with more specific possi-
bilities, may prove helpful.
Somewhere in the transaction, there must be an instrument
satisfying the statute of frauds, and, where applicable, the statutes
of conveyancing. Suppose that the original lease is oral, and that
the ratification is also oral. Clearly, absent a binding estoppel,
the lease would not be enforceable. Suppose, however, that while
the original lease is oral, the ratification is written. If this ratifi-
cation meets the requirements applicable to an original oil and
gas lease, it will be valid. x9 Thus, if the property is not homestead
18 Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 132 S. W. (2d) 553 (1939). Super.
seded by 139 Tex. 183, 164 S. W. (2d) 488 (1942). See also Baker v. Hamilton, 147
Tex. 240, 214 S. W. (2d) 460 (1948).
19 Humble Oil Co., et al. v. Clark, et al., 126 Tex. 262, 87 S. W. (2d) 471 (1935).
See also, Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Mullican, 144 Tex. 609, 192 S. W. (2d) 770(1946); 36 TEx. JUL., p. 723.
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and is community or the husband's separate property, and the
instrument complies with the statute of frauds (possibly, also,
words of conveyance are necessary) it is valid. If the property is
the separate property of the wife, or homestead, or both, then to
be enforceable such ratification instrument would have to be exe-
cuted by both husband and wife, and would have to include words
of conveyance and meet the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Suppose that the original lease has all the necessary requisites,
but has terminated by its own terms. If the primary term has ended
and there is no production, ratification would usually be futile,
because the moment after ratification the lease would again termi-
nate. A different situation exists, however, where the primary
term period has not expired or where there is production in suffi-
cient quantities to hold a lease.
Here, where the husband's signature is all that is necessary
(non-homestead and general community or the husband's separate
property) it seems clear that if the ratification act meets the re-
quirement of the statute of frauds, it is sufficient. The fact that the
instrument ratified includes words of conveyance, apparently re-
moves any question in this respect."0 Even where the statute of
frauds is not complied with, the original instrument may become
effective under the doctrine of adoption, or, possibly, ratification.2'
When the wife's signature is also necessary, a more difficult
problem is presented. First, it is here important to distinguish
between a lease which is void and one which is simply inoperative
at the wife's option, as, for example, where the property is gen-
eral community but also homestead. It seems settled that in the
latter instance, any written instrument properly executed by both
husband and wife sufficiently evidencing an intent to ratify will
have that effect.22
20 Leopard, et ux. v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., et at., 220 S. W. (2d) 259 Tex. Civ.
App. (1949) error rel. n. r. e.
21 Mondragon v. Mondragon, 113 Tex. 404, 257 S. W. 215 (1923); McDonald v.
Carlisle, 146 Tex. 206. 206 S. W. (2d) 224 (1947).
22 Grissom v. Anderson, 125 Tex. 26, 79 S. W. (2d) 617 (1935) ; Reserve Pet. Co.
v. Hodge, 147 Tex. 115, 213 S. W. (2d) 456 (1948).
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When the original lease has completely terminated, then it could
be at least reasonably argued that the asserted ratification agree-
ment must within itself have all of the requisites of a conveyance.
However, some cases originally citing cases in the other class, have
held the married woman bound even in the absence of words of
conveyance in favor of the lessee. 3
Conceivably, but not necssarily, the courts will hold that a mar-
ried woman can be bound by a ratifying act not meeting the
statute of frauds and not joined in by the husband where the lease
ratified was simply inoperative or subject to cancellation, but not
void. Where the lease is void, a minimum requisite would seem to
be an instrument meeting the statute of frauds and executed by
both husband and wife.24
A minimum requisite should always be sufficient evidence of an
actual intent to ratify. Suppose that a lease on a married woman's
separate property has actually terminated, or for some reason is
unenforceable as to her. Suppose that thereafter she and her hus-
band execute a mineral deed expressly subject to the lease. The
lessee of course is not even a party to the mineral deed. It is sub-
mittd that a fair and logical rule would be to permit evidence as
to an intention to ratify; however, at least one recent Supreme
Court opinion seems to indicate that such a reference when accom-
panied by language indicating an intent to ratify constitutes ratifi-
cation as a matter of law."6
23 See, for example, Leopard, et ux. v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra note 19.
Compare Pickens v. Bade, 129 Tex. 610, 104 S. W. (2d) 482 (1937).
24 Pickens v. Bade. supra note 23.
25 Reserve Pet. Co. v. Hodge, supra note 22. This case presented the converse in
that a reference in a lease to a prior deed was held to constitute ratification. Possibly
this result could be avoided by first prosecuting to judgment a suit to reform the
instrument including the reference. However. should such action be necessary when
no relief is desired as to the other party to the instrument assertedly constituting
ratification? See also Humble Oil Co. v. Clark, supra note 19; Turner v. Hunt, 131
Tex. 492, 116 S. W. (2d) 688, 117 A. L. R. 1066 (1938) ; Humble Oil & Refining Co.
v. Jeffrey, 38 S. W. (2d) 374 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd., 55 S. W. (2d) 521 (Tex.




In closing this section, it is again pointed out that it was with
reference to a situation where there is actually an instrument
meeting the formal requisites of a conveyance, but which is void
or otherwise unenforceable.
6. ESTOPPEL
The basic element of ratification is an intent to become bound
by some prior instrument or transaction. Estoppel on the other
hand had these basic elements: (1) Action by the lessor inconsis-
tent with an intent to avoid the transaction; (2) Reasonable reli-
ance thereon by the lessee; (3) Injury to the lessee which cannot
be reasonably remedied unless estoppel is applied. These three
elements are intended simply as general guides, and not as all-in-
clusive or hard and fast rules. For example, if a lease terminates
through failure to accept a delay rental, but the lessor accepts the
payment later, this may give rise to an estoppel.26 On the other
hand, the lessor may possibly avoid estoppel by proving mistake,
or that for some other reason it would be inequitable to apply
estoppel.
It is important to distinguish between acts of the husband and
those of the wife in determining whether estoppel should apply.
This is for the reason that a married woman can usually be bound
only by affirmative misrepresentations. 27 It is equally important
when relying upon the husband's acts to determine whether he has
power to act without his wife's joinder. For example, suppose he
accepts a late rental on land constituting general community but
also homestead. It seems clear that this action could not render the
lease enforceable against the wife.28 Distinguish this situation from
the one heretofore discussed where the husband accepts substituted
performance at a time when the lease is in effect.
26 Mitchell v. Simms, 63 S. W. (2d) 371 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
27 Humble Oil Refining Co. v. Downey, supra note 5; Thompson v. Crim, supra
note 17.
2s See, for ezmnple, Pickens v. Bade, supra note 23.
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7. RIGHT TO PAYMENTS MADE UNDER THE LEASE
If both the husband and wife execute the lease, payments may
be by joint deposit to their credit, unless the lease negatives an
agreement that may be so made.29
Aside from the joint deposit rule above referred to, if the leased
premises are general community or the husband's separate prop-
erty, all payments (absent express provisions to the contrary) are
payable to the husband. This is true regardless of whether or not
the property is homestead. If the property is the wife's separate
property, the advisable procedure is to secure an agreement from
both husband and wife as to how payments shall be made. It seems
clear that as bonus and royalties are considered corpus, they
could be properly paid to the wife. This is because of her right of
control over her separate property. While delay rentals are usu-
ally considered income,8" and thus community, there is a possible
question whether they are correctly so treated. Even considered
as income, it probably would be safe to pay the wife only." In
measuring risk, however, it should be remembered that an incor-
rect bonus or royalty payment might require another payment, but
an incorrect rental payment might end the lease. Thus, if the wife
is entitled to payment, a deposit not to her but rather to her and
her husband would be insufficient.82 As stated, the best procedure
is to secure an agreement from both as to how payments shall be
made.
29 Gulf Production Co. v. Perry, 51 S. W. (2d) 1107 (Tex. Civ. App., 1932) error
refused.
80 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, 76 F. (2d) 776 (5 Circ. 1935).
This case cites Carruthers v. Leonard, which was later overruled in Harris v. Currie,
142 Tex. 93, 176 S. W. (2d) 302 (1943).
31 See comment, 4 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 88 (1950).
82 Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 177 So. 59 (La. 1937) ; Compare Perkins v. Mag.
nolia Pet. Co., 148 S. W. (2d) 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error dismissed, correct
judgment.
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